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IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Tharanga Samarasinghe 
 
1.ABSTRACT 
The impacts of governance on economic growth is still only partially understood. The aim of 
this researh to understand the impact of governance on the economic growth. This study finds 
that control of corruption is a critical factor for economic growth and one unit increases in 
control of corruption causes   6.9% increse in the economic growth. However, it is important to 
manage both corruption control and political stability and absence of violence/ terrorism 
indicators effectively to achive a higher economic growth.  
In comparition to the European Union countries and the North American countries, the 
economic growth rate is significantly lower in all other regions except the Middle East and 
North Africa. The economic growth rate in high-income countries is 20% higher than the 
middle income countries. On the other hand, the low-income countries show 23.5% lower 
economic growth than the middle income countries. 
This research used data from 145 countries for the period of 2002-2014. The included 
governance variables are control of corruption, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, and voice and accountability. foreign direct investments, gross capital 
formation, government consumption, and trade openness were taken into account the model, to 
control their effects on economic growth.  Dummy variables were included to capture the 
regional effects and the effects of the income level of the countries. The fixed effects and 
random effects techniques were applied in a balanced panel. The main data sources are the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators and the World Development Indicators databases. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
The global distribution of income shows a highly uneven pattern of distribution. For instance, 
in 2015, the per capita GDP of North America was at least 34 times higher than the per capita 
GDP in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (The World Bank, 2016b). In addition to that, 
countries in some parts of the world have grown strongly over time while countries in other 
regions have not. The average nominal GDP in East Asia and the Pacific countries in 2015 
increased by 3711 times in comparison with the figures in 1968. But in the same period, the 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa grew only 868 times (The World Bank, 2016b). These figures  
reveal a growth difference in the different parts of the world. 
Although the theoretical models including the Solow model and new growth theory provide 
some level of explanation for the economic growth within a particular geographic boundary, 
understanding of economic growth is still incomplete (Romer, 2001). In addition to that, the 
existing growth models fail to provide a complete explanation for the cross-country growth 
differences (Romer, 2001). Although human capital accumulation, physical capital 
accumulation and technological progress are important determinants of economic growth in the 
major growth models (Acemoglu, 2009), in another view Hall and Jones (1999) show the 
importance of social infrastructure and government policies in economic growth. The concept 
of governance and its importance to economic growth was raised in the early 1990s (Perkins, 
Radelet, & Lindauer, 2006; The World Bank, 1994). 
Governance is a broad concept with great complexity to its major pillars. Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) define governance as a set of traditions and institutions that can be used to 
exercise the power of authority. Six basic dimensions of the governance are included political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, control of corruption and the rule of law (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 
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2010). These governance characteristics may influence several critical institutions that are 
essential for economic growth. These key institutions include well-defined property rights, 
unbiased contract enforcement, reduced information gap and stable macroeconomic conditions 
(Rodrik, & Subramanian, 2003). The governance indicators influence on these and eventually 
decide the country's economic growth in two ways. First, better governance creates a set of 
essential institutions that increases in the productivity of human and physical capital, and attract 
investment for developing human and physical capital. This process finally increases economic 
growth by following the Solow model and new growth theory. Second, following the social 
infrastructure theory, better governance improves the key institutions of the country and creates 
a favourable set of government policies for economic growth. Improved institutions and better 
government policies make an attractive environment for high investment in human and physical 
capital development, thereby achieving economic growth.  
3. Research objectives 
Although researchers show that governance can influence on economic growth, there is still 
much to uncover to ensure governance-related policies are appealing to policymakers. Most 
importantly, as literature reveals, the relationship between governance and economic growth 
has not been proved by enough evidence.  For the effective policy intervention, it is important 
to identify the important governance factors that affect on economic growth.  Therefore, the 
goal of this study is to measure the impact of governance on economic growth. Three objectives 
are set to fulfil the goal of the study: 
1) To study the overall relationship between governance and economic growth  
2) To investigate whether there is significant difference in economic growth rates among 
varying parts of the world 
3) To examine whether there is a significant difference in economic growth rates between high-
income countries and low-income countries. 
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1.Theoretical relationship between governance and economic growth 
Governance is a broad and multi-faceted concept. It describes the way that state power is 
exercised to manage its economic and social components (The World Bank, 1994). The manner 
in which the state exercises its power has a link to a set of institutions that engage as keys to 
economic growth. According to North (1991), Grief (1994), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010), North & Thomas (1973) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2003), 
there is a set of fundamental institutions needed for economic growth. These institutions include 
well-defined property rights, unbiased contract enforcements, low information gap between 
buyers and sellers, and stable macroeconomic conditions.  
4.2.Governance and major growth theories  
Political stability, the absence of terrorism and violence, proficient government policy 
formulation and implementation, improved regulatory mechanisms, reduced corruption and 
ensuring the rule of law can be recognised as high governance qualities (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi, 2010). The provision of accomplished governance leads to improvement in the 
institutions mentioned above. The increase in economic growth as a result of the high quality 
of institutions can be directly and indirectly explained by using the Solow model, new growth 
theory and social infrastructure view.  
The better quality institutions can contribute to the Solow model by increasing the availability 
of technology. It is clear that any form of bad governance, such as high political violence, 
terrorism and widespread corruption hurts citizens mentally and physically by decreasing their 
productivity. Then, it is reasonable to assume that better governance removes these physical 
and mental constraints and as a result, labour productivity improves. As Romer (2001) explains, 
the Solow model does not explain exactly the terms of technological improvement and, 
therefore, this rise in labour productivity is open to similar interpretation as the technological  
5 
 
improvement in the Solow model (Romer, 2001). Then, this technological improvement acts to 
increase economic growth through encouraging capital accumulation.  
In another view, the improved institutions provide a conducive environment for investors. In 
this argument, it follows that increased investment is made in physical and human capital 
development. Human capital development includes the knowledge, abilities and skills that are 
acquired by the individual worker through the learning process (Romer, 2001) and it results in 
an increase in the output per worker. On the other hand, increased investments in the physical 
capital increases capital per worker compared with the initial condition. These approaches 
eventually lead economic growth through the process of capital accumulation (Romer, 2001). 
New growth theory identifies the role of technology as a driving force for economic 
growth (Romer, 2001, Mankiw & Ball, 2011). The technological progress increases along with 
the rate of knowledge accumulation. In this model, research and development generates 
knowledge (Romer, 2001) and favourable institutions such as property rights  promote 
investment in research and development and thereby contribute to economic growth. 
In commenting on the Solow model, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that only a part of the output 
per worker can be explained using physical capital accumulation and the learning achievements 
of workers. The significant contribution to the remaining part of the cross-country differences 
in per-worker output carries the policy and institutional differences across countries (Hall & 
Jones, 1999). In addition to that, North (1991), North and Thomas (1973), Grief (1994), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, 2010 &2012) explain the importance of institutions and 
government policies in economic growth in various perspectives. According to this theory, 
better governance creates the favourable institutions and government policies that encourage 
investment and production. A higher level of investment in human capital and physical capital 
causes economic growth. On the other hand, better institutions and government policies allocate 
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a country’s valuable resources for production instead of diversion. Allocation of a country’s 
resources for investment and production causes an increase in the future output (Romer, 2001). 
Romer (2001) points out two pathways requiring consideration for the study of economic 
growth: growth over time and regional disparity. The Solow model and new growth theory can 
explain the growth over time. However, these neoclassical growth models have a weakness in 
explaining the regional disparity in the world. Although the concept of social infrastructure has 
a higher potential to provide a better explanation for the regional differences, there is an 
insufficient number of quality studies available in this area (Romer, 2001). However, as 
explained above, better governance can provide favourable economic conditions for 
technological progress, along with the human and physical capital formation that is key to 
economic growth.  
4.3.Corruption and economic growth 
Corruption means selling of the organisation’s resources, exclusive information and decision-
making power by a government party to a non-government party (Andvig & Meone, 1990).  In 
the corruption action, there is a supply arising from the government party and a demand arising 
from the non-government party (Andvig & Meone, 1990).  As Aidt (2009) argues, people have 
a different understanding of the impact of governance on economic growth. One group believes 
(Sanders) that the corruption has a negative effect on economic growth because it increases the 
transaction cost and the production cost. Most importantly, the corruption will decrease the 
consumer confidence and investor confidence and, degenerate the trust of the society. Finally, 
higher corruption causes a reduction in the overall institutional quality of the particular society. 
In contrast to Sanders, another group thinks that corruption brings an improvement in economic 
performance by removing bureaucratic bottlenecks such as delays in decision making regarding 
the issuing of licences, permits, approvals and the enforcement of contracts  (Aidt, 2009). 
7 
 
Tanzi (1998) describes several causes for the corruption demand as follows. First, governments 
implement rules and regulations for administrative purposes, which include providing licences, 
permits and different kinds of authorisations and inspections. Bureaucrats can seek bribes by 
using their authority to delay decisions. Second, the officers who administer taxes have 
authority to make decisions on tax incentives, tax liabilities and the implementation of relevant 
regulations. This power allows them to engage in rent-seeking activities. Third, bureaucrats 
make decisions on government spending and purchasing of good and services, and on public 
investment projects as part of the government’s activities. In these situations, they can ask for 
bribes from suppliers. Fourth, the government provides some goods and services (education, 
health, water, electricity and public housing) to the public at a subsidised price. Figure 1 
describes how bureaucrats engage in rent-seeking activities when government subsidies are 
provided. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1.Supply and demand of subsidies 
Source: (Tanzi, 1998, pp. 14, Figure 1) 
According to Figure 1, the government has a limited number of supply of goods and services 
(OA).  Considering the demand (D) and supply (S), the equilibrium price is P under free market 
conditions. The government decides the price is Q and it is less than the equilibrium price. At 
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price Q, the quantity demanded is equal to OB. Therefore, due to the lower price, an additional 
demand AB will be created. This additional demand will create an opportunity for the 
government officers to seek bribes.  
Tanzi (1998) identified many reasons for the supply of corruption including quality of 
bureaucracy, public sector wages, the penalties for corruption, institutional corruption control 
mechanisms, transparency of rules and regulations to the public and examples set by the 
leadership. A huge variation exists in the quality of bureaucrats expected from country to 
country. Evans and Rouch (1999) found a significant positive relationship between economic 
growth and bureaucratic quality.  
Government sector wage levels play an important role relevant to the reduction of corruption. 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) studied the relationship between public sector wages and the 
level of corruption and the result stressed the importance of wage increases in the government 
sector to reduce the corruption. Figure 2 illustrates the general relationship between corruption 
and government sector wages. When government sector wages are low, the level of corruption 
is high and when government sector wages are high, the expected corruption level is low (Tanzi, 
1998, P.17. Figure 2). In some countries, the government sector is relatively large and a large 
government sector leads a low wage levels bound to the high level of corruption. 
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Figure 2. The general relationship between the government wage level and corruption 
Source: (Tanzi, 1998, p. 17, Figure 2) 
 
4.4.Political Stability on economic Growth 
Political stability defines that the potential for maintaining a stable government without 
affecting from constitutional or unconstitutional changes (Alesina et al., 1992). The government 
or the political regime may change due to the voting power of the people within the 
constitutional framework of the country. In some countries, the political regime may change 
due to unconstitutional actions such as civil war.  
In another view, Feng (1997) argues that the political stability of a country may shift due to 
regular government change and irregular government change. In this view, regular government 
change is similar to constitutional change. Irregular government change may happen due to 
major irregular government change (e.g. unconstitutional change) and minor irregular change 
(e.g. policy change)  (Feng, 1997). The irregular political changes create an uncertain condition 
for investors and therefore economic growth decreases. As a result, many negative impacts may 
arise in the economy in both the short-run and the long-run. However, major government 
changes may positively affect economic growth if the new government can create a better 
environment for local and foreign investors by reducing the country’s risk and offering sound 
Wage Level 
Corruption 
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and consistent policies. The minor irregular change involves policy change. Policy changes 
need to be applied while maintaining political stability and without creating an investment risk 
(Feng, 1997). The stable political environment of the country increases the human capital and 
physical capital accumulation and thereby induces the growth process (Younis et al., 2008). 
4.5.Voice and accountability on economic growth 
The political system of a country may be democratic or authoritarian or combine parts of both. 
Under a democratic system, public participation is important in the selection process of political 
leaders. Voice and accountability describe the public participation in governance. This 
dimension of governance is directly related to democracy and transparency. Democracy in a 
country allows people to choose their rulers by vote. In the literature, there are three 
main schools of thought about how democracy affects economic growth (Sirowy & Inkeles, 
1990). These are the conflict perspective, the compatibility perspective and the 
skeptical perspective. 
The conflict perspective theorises that higher economic growth can be achieved by an 
authoritarian political regime because successful policy implementation for reforms is difficult 
under a democratic political system (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). This theory asserts there is a 
trade-off between democracy and economic growth — if a country achieves a higher level of 
democracy before it reaches a threshold level of economic growth it may face difficulty in 
achieving a higher level of economic growth (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). Therefore, the correct 
sequence is to first create economic growth and then establish a greater standard of democracy 
(Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990).  
Most developing countries today face difficulties achieving economic growth under democratic 
regimes because the governments in those countries have to take short-term policy decisions to 
satisfy the demands of various social groups. As a result, the government’s capacity will erode 
because it allocates scares national resources to satisfy various social groups rather than 
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allocating them to achieve higher growth (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). In comparison with the 
democratic regimes, the authoritarian states can achieve greater economic growth due to a better 
capacity to control resources and implement policies (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). By 
underpinning the arguments raised by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), Glaeser et al., (2004) claim 
that authoritarian regimes help poorer countries to improve their economic growth. After 
achieving some extent of economic growth, in the second stage, the political institutions then 
need to be refined. 
Compatibility perspective is the opposite of the conflict perspective and it highlights the 
importance of democracy and freedom in achieving economic growth. Democracy and political 
freedom are the prerequisites for proper contract enforcement, the safeguarding of law and 
order, and market expansion to achieve vigorous economic growth (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). 
The compatibility perspective stresses several weaknesses in the conflict perspective such as a 
tendency towards corruption and resource waste, the limited capacity of centrally controlled 
systems and adverse impacts on enterprise development (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). 
The skeptical perspective focuses on how some democratic mainstays such as the political party 
system, political culture and resource use in industrial sectors which have an independent 
influence on economic growth (Feng, 1997). In reality, both conflict and compatibility views 
are important concepts in economic growth. Democracy contributes to increased economic 
growth in two ways such as encouraging major regular government changes (changes within 
the constitution) and discouraging unconstitutional government changes (Feng, 1997). As the  
literature reveals, although East Asian economies show higher economic growth, the level of 
democracy in some of these countries is still poor. Therefore, it is imperative for the developing 
countries to understand the degree of democracy and the political mechanism that best supports 
them to achieve economic growth. 
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4.6. Relationships between governance and economic growth 
In the literature, various kinds of indicators stand in as proxy variables for governance. 
However, recent studies have predominantly used the World Governance Indicators. These 
indicators observe the six different dimensions of governance such as voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness, control of corruption and the rule of law. This section discusses the impacts of 
some of the important governance factors on economic growth. 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) claims that the relationship between quality of governance and 
per capita income is positive and strong. This argument apprehends a strong positive 
relationship between better governance and higher per capita income and a weak, negative 
correlation between higher per capita income and enhanced standards of governance 
(Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002). Under this scenario, although higher quality governance indicators 
encourage a higher per capita income, the higher per capita income does not follow through 
with improved governance quality. Emara and Jhonsa (2014) observed significant positive 
effects leading from governance quality to per capita income and a positive reverse relationship 
similar to that found by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). 
Corruption and economic growth nexus 
Several studies have looked into the relationship between corruption and economic growth. 
However, this relationship varies from study to study and different studies show completely 
different results. Pere (2015) found an insignificant relationship between corruption and 
economic growth. Contrary to this, Mo (2001) concludes there is a 0.72% reduction in growth 
rate, per 1%increase in the level of corruption. According to Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2007), the 
impact of corruption varies from country to country in accordance with the prevailing political 
regime. It can be argued that the influence of corruption is more harmful for the countries that 
have sound political institutions while the negative effects of corruption are reduced in the 
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countries with a corrupt political regime. Mo (2001) studied the impact of corruption on 
economic growth through different channels. According to his study, 53% of the overall 
negative impact of corruption on economic growth is contributed by political instability. In 
addition to that, the level of corruption depends highly on other institutional qualities such as 
culture and history (Treisman, 2000, Mo, 2001). Ata and Arvas (2011) argue that corruption 
has a link to the social, economic, cultural and judicial systems of a country. As mentioned in 
Treisman (2000), the degree of democracy in a country does not impact significantly on the 
level of corruption. Further to that, Mauro (1995) has revealed a significant negative 
relationship between corruption with both investment and economic growth. 
Political stability and economic growth nexus 
Political stability is an important factor relevant to the growth process, and some studies show 
a significant positive relationship between political stability and economic growth (Younis et 
al., 2008; Ramadhan et al., 2016; Tan & Abosedra, 2014; Aisen & Veiga, 2011). The political 
system of the country plays a key role in maintaining the political stability of the country. Both 
democratic regimes and the multiple party system combine to reduce political stability and 
thereby reduce economic growth (Younis et al., 2008). China’s economic miracle can be linked 
to the one-party political system and high levels of political stability. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to argue that low economic prosperity in India is to better levels of democracy  and 
a multi-party political system (Younis et al., 2008). However, Pere (2005) found that political 
stability did not have a statistically significant effect on economic growth. Alesina et al. (1992) 
reveal that political instability has a negative and significant impact on economic growth.  
Voice and accountability and economic growth nexus 
The voice and accountability variable links with the political system of the country. The 
participation of people in the governance process is high in a democratic system in comparison 
with more authoritarian systems. Higher levels of democracy mean increased levels of voice 
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and accountability, which in turn allow the rise of multiple political parties. Economic reform 
is more difficult under multiple political parties because the reforms create a heightened 
political risk for the next period of office for the existing ruling party. Decisions of the political 
elites are based on the self-interest and uncertainty (Adam, 2000). Ruling elites may not take 
the necessary action to undertake the required policy reforms under this uncertainty and 
therefore, it may hinder economic growth. Supporting this argument, Gani (2011) finds that 
voice and accountability have a significant and negative affect on economic growth.   
On the other hand, voice and accountability play a major role in the control of corruption and 
regulatory quality, and the rule of law. Mo (2001) shows that increasing corruption levels 
decrease the economic growth while Gani (2011) claims that, for developing nations, there is a 
negative and significant relationship between corruption control and economic growth. In 
addition to that, the regulatory quality and the rule of law show a negative but not significant 
association with economic growth (Gani, 2011). In balancing the empirical evidence, 
Salahodjaev (2015) reveals that a combination of impaired democracy and lower levels of social 
capital decrease economic growth. He/She further argues that democracy influences economic 
growth under the constraints of other social conditions such as the cognitive capacity of people 
in the society.  
The relationship between other governance factors and economic growth 
The Rule of Law is an important institution concerning economic growth because it directly 
links to ensuring personal security, property rights, unbiased contract enforcements and control 
of corruption (Haggard & Tiede, 2011). A government needs to maintain law and order, judicial 
independence and control of corruption to maintain the rule of law and to avoid the 
consequences of government failure. Rogobon and Rodrik (2004), Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 
(2004) and Hoggard and Tiede (2011) all emphasise a positive relationship between the rule of 
law and  economic growth. The operation of the rule of law in developed countries is much 
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more robust than in developing nations. When developing countries suffer from impaired rule 
of law there is an increased probability of corruption, expropriation and violence (Hoggard & 
Tiede 2011). Rogobon and Rodrik (2004) and Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2004) argue that 
both rule of law and democracy together play a more critical role in increasing economic growth 
rather than just the rule of law alone.  
Government effectiveness includes the quality of government service, competent policy 
formulation and its ability in implementation of the desired policy (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2010). Regulatory quality is also a complementary governance indicator for  
government effectiveness, describing the capacity of governments to take effective policy 
decisions to promote private sector growth (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010). La-Porta 
et al., (1999) highlight the importance of limited government intervention, a competent 
bureaucracy, and legitimacy in property rights and contract enforcement in the process of 
economic growth. As Easterly and Levine (1997) explain, there is an enormous income 
diversity among ethnic groups in Africa and one of the binding factors to this diversity is 
ineffective public policy. An unequal distribution of public goods underpinned by poor public 
policies may increase the inequality among different communities and different ethnic groups 
and thereby affect economic growth. In addition, La Porta et al. (1999) claim that better 
performing governments in developed nations collect a higher percentage of tax than those that 
perform poorly in the developing nations. The governments with a higher tax income can invest 
in human and physical capital formation. Burnside and Dollar (2000) mention that foreign aid 
is more effective if the recipient country has a sound and supportive policy environment.  
 
5.DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Description of data 
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This study uses the aggregated data from the World Bank. The data relevant to governance 
indicators (political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, control of corruption and voice 
and accountability) was gathered from the World Bank governance indicators database (The 
World Bank, 2016a). Data relevant to real per capita GDP purchasing power parity, foreign 
direct investment, gross capital formation, government consumption and trade openness data 
were taken from the world development indicators database of the World Bank (The World 
Bank, 2016b). The regional classification of countries was based on the World Bank’s country 
classification (The World Bank, 2016c). The categorisation of countries into different income 
groups was done based on the World Bank analytical classification data (The World Bank, 
2016d). This study uses data from 145 countries for a 13 year period. There are three 
governance variables, four control variables and eight dummy variables in this study. The 
descriptive statistics of this study can be shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of governance variables and control variables. 
Variance Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
lngdp 9.196 1.243  6.200        11.829 
cc 0.046 1.035 -1.836 2.553 
pv -0.086 0.956 -2.812 1.665 
va 0.005 0.955 -2.099 1.826 
fdi 5.360        10.635      -79.797      255.423 
gcapf       24.332  8.644         1.525      116.204 
gcons       15.488    5.066 2.047        32.232 
trad       91.692 55.199       19.118      455.277 
ssa 0.234  0.424 0 1 
mena 0.103  0.304 0 1 
sa 0.165  0.371 0 1 
la 0.048  0.214 0 1 
ca 0.145  0.352 0 1 
eap 0.124  0.330 0 1 
hi 0.300  0.458 0 1 
li 0.217  0.413 0 1 
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The governance variables represent the control of corruption (cc), political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism (pv) and voice and accountability (va).  Foreign direct investment (fdi), 
gross capital formation, (gcapf), government consumption (gcons) and trade openness (trad) 
are the control variables.  Sub–Saharan Africa (ssa), the Middle East and North Africa (mena), 
South Asia (sa), Latin America (la), Central Asia (ca), East Asia and the Pacific (eap) are the 
regional dummies. The dummy variables include high-income countries (hi) and low-income 
countries (li).  
When comparing the mean values of governance indicators, the mean value of political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism indicator is lower than the control of corruption and voice 
and accountability. The control of corruption indicator shows a higher value than the other two 
indicators. The mean value is 0.046 and the standard error is 1.035. Each of variable is discussed 
in details in the following sections.  
Table 2. Pairwise comparison for governance variables and dependent variable. 
 cc pv va lngdp 
cc 1.0000    
pv 0.7521(0.0000) 1.0000   
va 0.7777(0.0000) 0.6607(0.0000) 1.0000  
lngdp 0.7187(0.0000) 0.6241(0.0000) 0.5196(0.0000) 1.0000 
 
Note: Correlation coefficients are outside the brackets and the p-values are inside the brackets. 
Table 2 compares the correlation between the each pair of variables relevant to the control of 
corruption (cc), political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism (pv), voice and 
accountability (va) and the log of real per capita GDP (purchasing power parity) (lngdp).  In 
the Table 2, the values outside the brackets show the correlation coefficient between two 
variables, and the values inside the brackets show the p-values relevant to the relationship. The 
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p-values indicate that sample means are significantly different among varying governance 
indicators and each governance indicator with the dependent variable. Table 3 shows the the 
change of governance variables and the dependent variabl over the time from 2002 to 2014. 
Table 3. Changes of means of the variables over time  
Year Variables 
lngdp cc pv va 
2002 9.017 0.044 -0.070 0.002 
2003 9.044 0.065 -0.090 0.005 
2004 9.088 0.047 -0.095 0.032 
2005 9.125 0.038 -0.083 0.018 
2006 9.168 0.050 -0.080 0.010 
2007 9.212 0.055 -0.081 0.007 
2008 9.233 0.056 -0.093 0.000 
2009 9.217 0.050 -0.115 -0.003 
2010 9.246 0.048 -0.115 -0.002 
2011 9.273 0.041 -0.090 -0.002 
2012 9.292 0.032 -0.085 -0.008 
2013 9.309 0.041 -0.079 -0.010 
2014 9.324 0.029 -0.041 0.020 
 
Governance variables 
Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay developed the six governance indicators by aggregating the 
data from different sources (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002). These indicators caught general 
perceptions about governance and were based on several hundred indicators from 31 data 
sources (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010). These data sources are from main four types 
of sources including commercial business information providers, various kind of surveys, the 
data from non-government organisations and public sector information. The estimate for each 
governance indicator lies approximately between -2.5 (poor governance quality) and +2.5 (very 
high governance quality). According to Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), all these 
indicators are composite indexes.  
The world governance indicator database provides yearly data relevant to the above-mentioned 
governance indicators for a large number of countries for the period from 2002 to 2014 
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continuously. These governance indicators are voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law and 
control of corruption. In this research only control of corruption (cc), political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism (pv) and voice and accountability (va) indicators were selected 
to  use as explanatory variables, due to three main reasons.  
First, the general relationship of the indicators shows the government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality and the rule of law indicators are highly dependent on political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (pv), control of corruption (cc) and voice and accountability (va) indicators. 
Therefore, this research assumes that political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
control of corruption and voice and accountability are key governance indicators. Second, this 
research considers only the variables that have correlation coefficients of less than 80% because 
it avoids the multicollinearity problem. By comparing the different combinations of variables, 
only control of corruption (cc), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) and 
voivece and accountability (va) show the correlation coefficients of less than 0.8 compared with 
other governance indicators. Third, it is important to keep a level of parsimony in the model 
and, adding more variables can damage the parsimony of the model.  
a.Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
As Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, (2010) explain this indicator measures the possibility of 
changes in government due to unconstitutional reasons. The unconstitutional reasons may 
include terrorism or politically related violence. This indicator covers unconstitutional reasons 
including interstate war, civil war, terrorism, protest and riots, government stability, 
political crises and civil unrest — things that cause a government to change (The World Bank 
Group, 2016a).  
b.Voice and accountability 
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This indicator measures the government’s ability to protect the country’s democracy and respect  
citizens’ rights by considering the level of citizen participation in the selection of government, 
the citizens’ level of freedom of expression and association, and media freedom (Kaufmann, 
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010). Some of the important components of this indicator include the 
democracy, accountability of public officials, human rights, freedom of association and 
demonstration, civil liberties and media freedom. In addition, this indicator takes into account 
the electoral system, transparency of government, protection of the rights of  minority groups, 
the reliability of the state’s financial system, freedom of exit and entry to the country and use 
of military power in politics (The World Bank Group, 2016a). 
c.Control of corruption 
According to Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), the control of corruption indicator 
captures the perception relevant to the level of public power used for private interests. The 
corruption ranges from small scale examples to the capturing of the state power by elites. The 
indicator measures the behaviour of politicians and public officials in relation to corruption by 
considering irregular payments, transparency and accountability in the government sector and 
any anticorruption activities. The irregular payments may happen within various avenues such 
as export and import, public utilities, public contracts, tax collection and judicial decisions (The 
World Bank Group, 2016a). 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the log of the real gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing 
power parity, and the unit of measurement is the constant international dollar in 2011. The 
purchasing power parity based GDP eliminates the changes in price levels over the period and 
thereby allows for a more reliable estimation.  
Control variables 
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The control variables allow the study of the impact of governance indicators when other factors 
are controlled. In this study control variables include the foreign direct investment (fdi), gross 
capital formation (gcapf), government consumption (gcons) and trade openness (trad). The 
foreign direct investment (fdi) contains the net inflow of foreign direct investment as a 
percentage of GDP. Gross capital formation is measured as a percentage of GDP and considers 
the changes in fixed assets and the level of inventories. Government expenditure measures the 
government’s final consumption expenditure on purchasing of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP. Trade openness calculates the sum of imports and exports as a percentage 
of GDP (The World Bank, 2016b). 
Regional dummies 
According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004), cross-country differences are based on 
institutions, geography and culture. Diamond (1997) and Sachs (2001) stress the importance of 
geography on agricultural and economic systems. Based on this evidence, one of the objectives 
of this research is to investigate the relationship between governance indicators and economic 
growth in the different regions of the world. The regional dummies included represent the Sub-
Saharan-Africa (ssa), Middle East and North Africa (mena), South Asia (sa), Latin America 
(la), Central Asia (ca), and East Asia and the Pacific (eap). Each country included in the samples 
is separated by the regions based on the World Bank’s country classification in 2016 (The 
World Bank, 2016c).  
Dummy variables for the level of income 
According to Grief (1994) and Guiso et al. (2006) the cultural impact on the economic system 
varies between high-income countries and low-income countries. Therefore, the dummy 
variables for high-income countries (hi) and low-income countries (li) are included in order to 
estimate the impact of governance on economic growth due to the income level of the country. 
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Based on the World Bank data, all countries are divided into three groups such as low income, 
middle income and high-income. 
5.2. Sampling 
In most of the cross-country analysis, the researchers select samples based on the data 
availability (Ray, 2002). This study includes 145 countries based on the data availability for 
each variable. As shown in the tables, this sample includes the countries representing the 
various regions of the world and different income groups. The sample used in this study is 
highly representative, and it increases the precision power of the estimates. This sample was 
taken representing the Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Europe 
and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and North America.   
Table 4. Distribution of samples. 
4(a) Based on the geographical region 
Region Number of countries in the sample 
Central Asia 19 
East Asia and Pacific 18 
Latin America 24 
Middle East and North Africa 15 
South Asia 7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 34 
Other*1 28 
Total 145 
 
4(b) Based on the income levels 
Income level of the countries Number of countries in the sample 
Low income 22 
Middle income 50 
High income 37 
Low to middle income (during the period) 23 
Middle to high income (during the period) 12 
                                                          
1 Other* category represent the 26 European Union members, the United State and Canada 
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Low to high income (during the period) 1 
Total 145 
 
5.3. Econometric model 
The econometric model is used for the balanced panel in this study and the econometric model 
is analysed using the pooled ordinary least square method (Pooled OLS), fixed effects (FE) 
method and random effects method (RE). The Pooled OLS estimation compares with the fixed 
effects estimation using the F test. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is 
used to compare the random effects model with Pooled OLS model.  The fixed effects model 
compares with the random effects model using the Hausman test. Although the Hausman test 
indicates the fixed effects model is more appropriate than the RE model, the random effects 
model is used to explain the regional effect because the Hausman test omits all the regional 
dummies. Both fixed and random effects models have corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
serial autocorrelation before being used in the interpretation. However, As Torres-Reyna (2007) 
mentions, serial correlation does not create problems if the time series data is less than 20 years, 
as applies to this study.   
The governance indicators include control of corruption (cc), political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (pv) and voice and accountability (va). Foreign direct investments (fdi), 
gross capital formation (gcapf), government consumption (gcons) and trade openness (trad) are 
the control variables.  β1 to β7 represent the corresponding coefficients for governance 
indicators and the control variables. The error term is ε(it ), i and t indicate the country and time 
respectively. The dependent variable (lngdp) is the log of real per capita GDP (purchasing 
power parity based) of the constant international dollar (2011).  regional dummies for Sub-
Saharan Africa (ssa), the Middle East and North Africa (mena), South Asia (sa), Latin America 
(la), Central Asia (ca) and East Asia and the Pacific (eap) indicate in corresponding coefficients 
from  δ1 to δ6.  γ1   and  γ2   indicate the coefficients for high-income countries (hi) and low-
income countries (li) respectively.   
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Pooled OLS model (Equation 1.) 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽2𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑠𝑠𝑎
+  𝛿2𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎 +  𝛿3𝑠𝑎 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑎 +   𝛿5𝑐𝑎+  𝛿6𝑒𝑎𝑝 +𝛾1ℎ𝑖+𝛾2𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
i=1, ………,145,         t=1,………,13              ∝: Constant 
Fixed effects model (Equation 2.) 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽2𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑠𝑠𝑎
+  𝛿2𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎 +  𝛿3𝑠𝑎 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑎 +   𝛿5𝑐𝑎+  𝛿6𝑒𝑎𝑝 +𝛾1ℎ𝑖+𝛾2𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
   𝛼𝑖: Group-specific constant term 
Random effects model (Equation 3.) 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽2𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑠𝑠𝑎
+  𝛿2𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎 +  𝛿3𝑠𝑎 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑎 +   𝛿5𝑐𝑎+  𝛿6𝑒𝑎𝑝 +𝛾1ℎ𝑖+𝛾2𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 𝑢𝑖: Group specific random term 
6. RESULTS  
Selection of model 
The specified econometric model is estimated for pooled OLS (Equation 1.), fixed effects  
(Equation 2.) and random effects model (Equation 3.). Both fixed and random effects models 
were estimated without robust standard errors. According to the p-value, all three models are 
significant at the 5% level. Although any of these models can be used, it is important to identify 
the most appropriate model, and therefore the following mix of comparisons were conducted 
between models: 
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1. Pooled OLS against the fixed effects 
2. Pooled OLS against the random effects 
3. Fixed effect against the random effects. 
 
Pooled OLS vs fixed effects 
The results from F test for the fixed effects model are as follows: 
              F test that all u_i=0:       Prob>F=0.0000     F statistics:18.70 
According to above results, the p-value of the fixed effects model (p=0.000) is less than 0.05 
and therefore the null hypothesis (𝑢𝑖 = 0) is rejected (Stata Corp, 2013) and we conclude that 
fixed effects model is more appropriate than the random effects model in this analysis. 
Pooled OLS vs random effects 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is used to differentiate the best model between 
the random effects model and the Pooled OLS model (Park, 2011; Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
According to the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test, chibar2 is equal to 4938.48 and 
the p-value of chibar2 statistics is equal to 0.000. The probability of chibar2 statistics is less 
than 0.05. Then we reject the null hypothesis and draw the conclusion that the random effects 
model is more appropriate than the fixed effects model (Stata Corp, 2013).  
Fixed effects vs random efffects 
The Hausman test can differentiate the best choice between the random effects and fixed effects 
models. The result obtained from Hausman test is as below: 
         Chi2  statistic =        315.6  ,          P-value of chi2 statistics   =0.0000 
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Because the p-value of the test is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H0) of the Hausman test is 
rejected. As a result, the fixed effects model is more appropriate than random effects method in 
this study (Wooldridge, 2009).  
Diagnostic test for fixed and random effects models  
The diagnostic tests were conducted for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, serial correlation 
and stationary. 
The Variance Inflationary Factor (VIF) was analysed in the model as in and the result of the 
test can be seen in Table 5. However, in this analysis, the VIF values of all variables are less 
than 6 and the mean VIF is 2.55. Therefore, this model does not include multicollinearity 
problems.  
Table 5. VIF values from the multicollinearity test. 
Variable VIF 
cc 5.82 
va 4.62 
ssa 3.67 
pv 3.03 
hi 2.90 
la 2.39 
mena 2.24 
eap 2.11 
li 2.06 
ca 1.97 
sa 1.89 
gcons 1.64 
trad 1.46 
fdi 1.24 
li 1.24 
Mean VIF 2.55 
 
 
Table 6.Test results 
Chi2 test  test for Fixed Effect Model Chi2 statistics =0.0000 
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier for 
Random Effect model 
p-value=0.0000 
Wooldridge test for Autocorrelation F statistics is equal to 452.502 and the 
probability of F statistics is equal to 0.000. 
Levin-Lin-Chu test for the unit roots relevant 
to the governance and control variables 
p-value of all tests were 0.000 
 
Fixed effects and random effects models estimated with the robust standard errors 
Both fixed effects and random effects models are re-estimated with robust standard errors to 
correct the model for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation (Stata Corp, 
2013;Wooldridge, 2002).  
Results from both fixed effects estimation and random effects estimation are summarised in 
Table 7.  
Table 7. The estimation resuts from random effects and fixed effects models. 
(values are reported outside the brackets, saying the coefficients relevant to each variable and 
the robust standard errors are included inside the brackets) 
Dependent variable: log of real per capita GDP (PPP) 
Variables Fixed effects (FE) Random effects 
(RE) 
cc 0.069 (0.033)** 0.136 (0.028)*** 
pv 0.043 (0.032) 0.059(0.032)* 
va -0.041(0.049) -0.013(0.045) 
fdi -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001) 
gcapf 0.004(0.002)** 0.004(0.002)** 
gcons -0.003(0.004) -0.004(0.004) 
trad -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
ssa - -1.839 (0.180)*** 
mena  - -0.060(0.254) 
sa - -1.595(0.177)*** 
la - -0.809(0.107)*** 
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ca - -0.519(0.184)*** 
eap - -0.519(0.219)** 
hi 0.180(0.024)*** 0.253(0.027)*** 
li -0.268(0.032)*** -0.298(0.033)*** 
cons 9.179(0.087)*** 9.950 (0.122)*** 
N (obs) 1885 1885 
N(groups) 145 145 
R2 (Overall) 0.83 0.73 
 
                               Significant:***1% Level,  **5% level, *10% level 
The p-value of both random effects and fixed effects models is 0.0000. Then, at the 5% 
significance level, the p-values of both models is less than the critical value (p=0.05). Therefore, 
the overall model becomes significant at the 5% level of significance. This conclusion is valid 
for both fixed and random effects models and both models with robust standard errors are 
significant at the 5% significance level.  
In fixed effects and random effects models, the overall R-Squared are 0.83 and 0.73 
respectively. This means, in the fixed effect model, the explanatory variables can explain 83% 
of the variation in the log of real GDP per capita (PPP), and in the random effects model it is 
73% percent. The within and between R2 for the fixed effects model are 0.2 and 0.88 
respectively.  The random effects model is concerned, the within and between R2 are 0.19 and 
0.73 respectively.  
As indicated in Table 7, the coefficients of constant show a positive sign and approximately 
similar values in both the fixed and random effects models. The values of the coefficients of 
constant and the robust standard error are 9.179 and 0.087 respectively in the fixed effects 
model. The magnitudes of the coefficients and the robust standard error in the random effects 
model report the 9.950 and 0.122 respectively. The coefficients in both fixed and random effects 
models are significant at the 5% level of significance. 
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The coefficients for control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
and the voice and accountability variables are 0.069, 0.043 and (-0.041) respectively. However, 
for the random effects model, coefficients for control of corruption (cc), political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism (va), and voice and accountability (va) indicators show 0.136, 
0.059 and (-0.013). There is a difference between coefficients of governance indicators in fixed 
effects and random effects models. However, the standard errors for each governance variable 
in both fixed and random effects models are very similar. The robust standard errors for control 
and corruption (cc), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) and voice and 
accountability (va) variables in the fixed effects model are respectively 0.033, 0.032 and 0.049 
respectively. In the random effects model, the standard errors for control of corruption (cc), 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) and the voice and accountability (va) 
are 0.028, 0.032 and 0.045. The corruption control (cc) variable show the statistical significance 
at 5% significant level in both the fixed effect and the random effects model. Although political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) do not become significant in the fixed effects 
model, it is significant at the 10% level of significance in the random effects model.  The voice 
and accountability (va) indicator does not become significant at any of these models. The 
coefficients of both control of corruption (cc), and political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (pv) indicators show the positive sign, while the coefficient of voice and 
accountability (va) indicator shows the negative sign in both fixed and random effects models.  
The coefficients of control variables are approximately similar in both fixed and random effects 
models. In both models, coefficients for foreign direct investments (fdi), gross capital formation 
(gcapf) and trade openness (trad) are approximately equal and the values for each variable are 
(-0.001), 0.004 and (-0.000) respectively. The coefficient of government consumption is              
(-0.003) in the fixed effects model and (-0.004) in the random effects model. The standard errors 
of both models are similar. The robust standard errors for foreign direct investments (fdi), gross 
capital formation (gcapf), government consumption (gcons) and trade openness (trad) follow 
30 
 
0.001, 0.002, 0.004 and 0.000 respectively. It is important to highlight that the only significant 
control variable in this model is gross capital formation (gcapf). The gross capital formation 
(gcapf) becomes significant at the 5% level of significance by showing the positive sign. All 
other control variables show a negative correlation to the log of real per capita GDP (PPP). 
The fixed effects model omits the regional dummies because those variables are time invariant. 
However, the random effects model captures the impacts of regional effects on economic 
growth. Most importantly, all these coefficients show a negative sign because the economic 
growth in the reference group2 is higher than in real per capita GDP (PPP) than in any other 
region of the study. The lowest coefficients reported are from Sub-Saharan Africa (-1.839) and 
South Asia (-1.595). The robust standard errors for Sub-Saharan Africa (ssa) and the South Asia 
(sa) are 0.180 and 0.177 respectively. Following the Sub-Saharan Africa and the South Asia, 
the third lowest coefficient was observed in the result for Latin America, and the magnitudes 
of the coefficients and standard errors are (-0.809) and 0.107 respectively. The observed values 
of the coefficient for both Central Asia (ca), and East Asia and the Pacific (eap) are similar and 
it is (-0.519) in number. However, the robust standard errors for these regions are considerably 
different. The robust standard error for the Central Asia (ca), and the East Asia and Pacific 
regions are 0.184 and 0.219 respectively. The real per capita GDP growth in the Middle East 
and North Africa region is less deviated from the reference group. The values for the coefficient 
and the robust standard errors in the Middle East and North Africa region are (-0.060) and 
0.254. Except for the Middle East, all other regional dummies become significant at the 5% 
level of significance. The regional dummy for the Middle East and North Africa is insignificant. 
When the dummy variables for the income levels are considered, the dummy variable for the 
high income group shows a positive sign in comparison with the reference3 group in both 
                                                          
2 Reference group of the regional dummy includes the European Union member countries, the United States 
and Canada. 
3 Reference group of the dummy variable for the income group is the middle-income countries. 
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random and fixed effect model.  The value of the coefficient of the high income dummy variable 
is 0.180 in the fixed effects model and it is 0.253 in the random effects model. The standard 
errors of the coefficients of the dummies for the high income group are 0.024 in the fixed effects 
model and 0.027 in the random effects model. In contrast to the high income dummy, the low 
income dummy shows a negative sign in comparison to the middle income reference group.  
The values of the coefficients and robust standard error for the low income dummy in the fixed 
effects model are (-0.268) and 0.032 respectively. As far as the random effects model is 
concerned, the value of the coefficient and the robust standard error of the low-income dummy 
are (-0.298) and 0.033 respectively. The dummy variables for both high and low income groups 
become significant at the 5% significance level. 
Table 8. Antilogarithms of coefficents of regional and income dummies. 
Dummy variable The converted value of the coefficient 
Sub-Saharan Africa (ssa) (-84%) 
Middle East and North Africa (mena) (-6%) 
Latin America (la): (-55%) 
South Asia (sa): (-80%) 
Central Asia (ca) (-40%) 
East Asia and the Pacific (eap) (-40%) 
High Income Countries (hi) 19.7% 
Low-income countries (li) (-23.5%) 
 
Comparision of control of corruption indicator on the regional and income differences  
Control of corruption is the significant governance indicator at the 5% significance level in both 
fixed and random effects models. Therefore, analysis of variance (single factor) tests were 
conducted to compare the each pair of groups for control of corruption indicator (Black et al, 
2013). The results from group wise comparison based on regions and income levels are 
summarised in table 9 and table 10. 
Table 9. Comparision of control of corruption indicator for each pair of regions 
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 ssa sa la ca eap 
 
sa 1.34 
(0.0000) 
    
la 160.92 
(0.0000) 
22 
(0.0000) 
   
ca 82 
(0.0000) 
16 
(0.0000) 
1.07 
(0.299) 
  
eap 156 
(0.0000) 
52 
(0.0000) 
20 
(0.0000) 
21 
(0.0000) 
 
Reference 
group 
1326 
(0.0000) 
352 
(0.0000) 
361 
(0.0000) 
285 
(0.0000) 
100 
(0.0000) 
 
(Note: F-statistics are outside the brackets. The p-values are within the brackets) 
 
Table 10. Comparision of control of corruption indicator for each pair of income group 
 hi li 
li 1005 
(0.0000) 
 
mi 1677 
(0.0000) 
218 
(0.0000) 
 
(Note: F-statistics are outside the brackets. The p-values are within the brackets) 
 
Except the Central Asia-Latin America comparison, the P-value of all other all other pairs of 
comparison is less than 0.05. Then, at the 5% significance level, the control of corruption 
indicator is significantly different for each pair of groups. As far as income groups are 
concerned, the control of corruption indicator is significantly different for all pair of groups, at 
the 5% significant level. 
 
7. Discussion 
This research studies the impact of governance on economic growth using the widely accepted 
dataset from the years 2002 to 2014 (13 years for 145 countries). The analytical approach 
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follows the fixed effects and random effects models with robust standard errors, therefore these 
models do not suffer due to heteroskedasticity or serial autocorrelation problems. The models 
will not go for spurious regression because there is no serious multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables and the variables become stationary. As the Hausman test suggested that 
the fixed effects model was more appropriate than the random effects model in this study, the 
results from fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors is used mainly for interpretation 
purposes. However, the random effects model with robust standard errors is used to explain the 
regional effects because fixed effects estimation omits all the regional variables. In addition to 
that, the random effects model with robust standard errors is also used in the discussion as 
required to show the important relationships. However, if it is not specifically mentioned as the 
random effects model, in all other places, for all other variables except the regional dummies 
are explained using the fixed effects model. 
Impact of governance on economic growth 
According to the empirical results of this study, the governance quality affects economic growth 
significantly. The corruption control is the most important determinant of economic growth and 
it can influence the economic growth more than any other growth determinants looked at in the 
study. As the fixed effects model of this research reveals, a one unit increase in control of 
corruption (cc) raises the real GDP per capita (PPP) growth on average by 6.9%, if all other 
variables are constant. The positive relationship between the real per capita GDP (PPP) and the 
control of corruption is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The direction of the 
observed relationship between governance and economic growth is similar to the expected 
outcome. However, the political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv), and voice and 
accountability (va) indicators do not become statistically significant at the 5% level in the fixed 
effects model of this study.  
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In this study, control variables represent some of the other factors that determine economic 
growth, in addition to governance. When control variables are considered, only gross capital 
formation (gcapf) is significant at the 5% level of significance, and all other control variables 
are insignificant in both fixed and random effects models.  The gross capital formation (gcapf) 
shows a positive relationship to the real per capita GDP (PPP) growth as theoretically expected. 
If all other variables are constant, 1% increases in the gross capital formation (gcapf) raises the 
economic growth on average by 0.4% at the 5% significance level in both fixed and random 
effects models. According to this study, other control variables, such as foreign direct 
investment (fdi), government consumption (gcons) and the trad (trad) show a negative 
relationship to the real per capita GDP growth. Therefore, it is obvious that the impact of 
governance on economic growth is higher than the effects of other variables such as foreign 
direct investments (fdi), gross capital formation (gcapf), government consumption (gcons) and 
trade openness (trad).  
The political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) show a positive relationship with 
the economic growth as expected. However, it is important to highlight that the political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) indicator is significant at the 10% level of 
significance in the random effects model and the direction of the relationship is also positive. 
Therefore, there may be a practically significant relationship between the political stability and 
violence/terrorism (pv) indicator and economic growth.  
The voice and accountability indicator (va) is not significant in both the fixed and random 
effects model. However, the result of the voice and accountability (va) indicator is negative in 
this research. This is an important finding of this research, and it highlights that some of the 
socially important factors like democracy and freedom do not affect economic growth 
significantly. 
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The study indicates the reality of the importance of corruption control in governance. Countries 
such as Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Guinea-
Bissau, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe show a very low value in the corruption control 
indicator. For instance, the real per capita GDP (PPP) for 2014 is international $711 (constant 
2011) in Congo Democratic Republic and it is 803 in Liberia. On the other hand, the countries 
that demonstrate the highest corruption control levels such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Iceland, Luxemburg, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland 
have a higher real per capita GDP (PPP) that varies from international $34,263 to international 
$91,368. As Tanzi (1998) notes, with lower public sector wages and low-quality bureaucrats, 
the effectiveness of corruption control mechanisms is crucial. The higher corruption level in 
low-income countries may be associated with the reasons mentioned above. As Evans and 
Rouch (1999) explain, low bureaucratic quality in low-income countries may cause the high 
corruption and low economic growth. 
Regional impact of governance and economic growth 
As this study reveals, the real per capita GDP growth rate depends on the regional specific 
factors. The highest economic growth rate can be observed in the reference group, which 
represents the European Union member countries and the some of the North American 
countries. According to the random effects model, all other regional dummies are significant at 
the 5% significance level, except for the Middle East and North Africa region. Signs of the 
coefficients of all regional dummies are negative. The results indicate that the rates of real per 
capita GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are respectively 84% and 80% lower 
than the reference group. Latin America shows 55% lower growth rate in real GDP per capita 
than the reference group when all the other variables are constant. The real per capita GDP 
growth rates in Central Asia and, East Asia and the Pacific regions are on average 40% lower 
than the reference group.  
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In this sample, South Asia shows the lowest average value in political stability and the absence 
of violence (pv) indicator among all the regions of the world. The control of corruption indicator 
in South Asia shows the second lowest value, and it is only higher than the result for Sub-
Saharan Africa. The voice and accountability indicator also demonstrates a lower value. When 
Sub-Saharan Africa is considered, it is the highest corrupted region in the world. The average 
value for the control of corruption indicator for the period is -0.671. The political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism indicator shows the second lowest value in the sample, at -0.671 
units. The political instability in Sub-Saharan Africa is high, and it is lower only in the South 
Asia region. It is important to highlight that the South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa regions 
suffer due to higher corruption and lower political stability compared with other regions. The 
voice and accountability indicator of these two regions also shows a lower value. The high 
political instability and high corruption level may underpin the lower real per capita GDP (PPP) 
growth in the region. 
The Central Asia classification includes a group of countries — excluding European Union 
members — which were categorised under Europe and Central Asia in the World Bank’s 
country classification in 2016 (The World Bank, 2016c). The average value of control of 
corruption (cc), political stability and absence of violence (pv), and voice and accountability 
(va) indicators in Central Asia are -0.110, -0.067 and -0.071 respectively. Except for political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, both other governance indicators are lower in this 
region when sample means are considered. 
When East Asia and the Pacific region is considered, the control of corruption and political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism indicators are 0.046 and 0.299 in units, respectively. 
The value of the voice and accountability (va) indicator is -0.068. In both the control of 
corruption (cc) indicator and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) 
indicators, Central Asia shows negative value in both indicators while East Asia and Pacific 
regions also show a negative value in both indicators.  The voice and accountability (va) 
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indicator is approximately similar in both regions. The overall governance in these two regions 
are also approximately similar. The real per capita GDP (PPP) in both these regions are on 
average 40% lower than the reference group, when all other variables are constant. 
The regional dummy for Latin America indicates the real per capita GDP growth rate in Latin 
America is 55% per cent lower than the reference group, if all other variables keep constant.  
The observed growth rate for Latin America is lower than the Central Asia and East Asia 
regions and higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions. The control of 
corruption indicator and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism indicators in this 
region are   -0.031 and 0.061. However, the voice and accountability indicator is 0.360 in the 
Latin America result and it is much higher than both Central Asia, and East Asia and Pacific 
regions. The voice and accountability indicator in Latin America is second only to the value of 
that in the European Union member countries, the United States and Canada, which are included 
in the reference group. As explained by the econometric model, the higher voice and 
accountability leads to a lower economic growth result and Latin America may be affected due 
to this reason.  
 
 
Figure 3. The relationship between governance indicators and real per capita GDP growth in 
different regions of the world 
ca(-0.519)
eap (-0.519)
la(-0.809)
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ssa (-1.838)
Other*
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 (In the figure 3, values mentioned in the brackets show the percentage of growth reduction in 
comparison with the reference4 group.) 
As above mentioned, there is a close relationship between the economic growth and the 
governance indicators in different regions of the world. Figure 3 illustrates the percentage 
reduction of real per capita GDP in each region of the world with the reference group which 
represents the European Union member countries and the North American countries. It clearly 
shows a higher percentage reduction in economic growth rate in each region is closely related 
to the lower mean values of control of corruption (cc) and political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (pv). For instance, there is a higher percentage reduction in growth rate for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia because these two regions show the lowest governance 
qualities relevant to all three governance indicators considered. These findings clearly show 
that there are regional-specific effects of governance qualities and this effect leads a regional 
variation in economic growth. Figure 3 shows how growth differences in different regions link 
with corruption control (cc) and political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism (pv) 
indicators.  
According to table 7., the control of corruption indicator which is significant in both fixed and 
random effects models are considered, it is significantly different among all regions except 
Latin America-Central Asia comparison, at the 5% significance level. However, level of control 
of corruption is similar in both Latin America and Central Asia.  
High income and low income counters 
As the fixed effects model indicates, there is a difference in growth rates between high-income 
and low-income countries. As this research reveals, the high income and low income dummies 
are significant in both random and fixed effects models. In the fixed effect model, the real per 
capita GDP growth rate in high-income countries is 20% higher than in the middle-income 
reference group, if all other variables hold constant. On the other hand, on average, the real per 
                                                          
4 The other* category in the Figure 3 represents the reference group. 
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capita GDP growth rate in low-income countries is 23.5% lower than the real per capita GDP 
growth rate in the reference group in the fixed effects model, when all other conditions are 
constant. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% significance level. As far as the signs of 
coefficients are concerned, it is positive for the high-income dummy and negative for the low-
income dummy as theoretically expected. Following figure 4 illustrates the relationship 
between income level of countries and governance properties. According to the figure, both 
control and corruption and political stability and absence of violence/ terrorism indicators show 
a close relationship with income level of countries. The high-income countries have high level 
of corruption control and high level of political stability while low-income countries show a 
lower value in both control of corruption (cc) and political stability and absence of violence/ 
terrorism (pv) indicators. Each income group is significantly different in control of corruption 
indicator at the 5% level of significance. This means the high-income group is significantly 
different from rest of the countries in the sample at the 5% significance level. In addition, the 
low-income country group is also significantly different from both high and middle income 
countries at the 5% level of significance.  
                                         
Figure 4 The relationship between governance indicators and real per capita GDP growth in 
different income groups of the world 
The overall relationship   
hi (+20%)
mi (0)li  (-23.5%)
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This research reveals that governance plays an important role as a determinant of economic 
growth. A one unit increment in the control of corruption indicator raises the real GDP per 
capita by 6.9% at 5% significance level. However, the political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (pv) indicator and the voice and accountability (va) indicators do not show 
a statistically significant relationship with the real per capita GDP growth in the fixed effects 
model. The regional specific effect on economic growth also needs to be considered when most 
of the geographical regions are examined. The income level of countries also has a direct 
relationship to the governance conditions. High-income countries have better governance 
qualities and higher real per capita GDP growth rates. The opposite relationship can be observed 
in the low-income countries. Therefore, the overall relationships can be summarised as follows 
in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Overall relationship between governance and economic growth 
 
According to the fixed effects model of this study, the control of corruption is the most 
important governance variable that influences economic growth. However, as random the 
Higher economic growth rate 
Higher level of corruption control, 
higher level of political stability and 
absence of violence 
Creating growth enhancing factors 
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effects model indicates, the political stability and absence of violence (pv) indicator shows a 
significant relationship to the economic growth at the 10% significance level. In addition, the 
coefficients of both these relationships are positive. Therefore, it is practical to assume that the 
economic growth rate depends on both control of corruption (cc), and political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism (pv) indicators.  
The income level of the country and its geographical location has a direct influence on the 
control of corruption (cc) and the political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv). 
However, it is necessary to understand that the control of corruption, and political stability and 
absence of violence indicators may linked to many more social, economic and political factors.  
Higher governance quality (such as lower corruption and higher political stability) increases 
human capital productivity and investment in technology and thereby increase the economic 
growth, following the Solow model and new growth theory. On the other hand, higher 
governance quality also improves institutional quality and the social infrastructure of the 
country and thereby increases economic growth, following social infrastructure theory. As an 
example, countries such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland show a higher real per capita GDP, 
lower corruption level and higher political stability and those countries represent the high-
income group. In addition, according to the World Bank classification, these countries fall into 
the Europe and Central Asia region. Countries such as Central African Republic, Chad and the 
Congo Democratic Republic, which have very low per capita GDP, show a higher level of 
corruption and a higher political instability. Finally, these countries represent the low-income 
group and share the same geographic region.  
Control of corruption (cc) and political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism (pv) 
indicators may influence how a country is affected by both internal and external factors. These 
internal and external factors may increase or decrease the economic growth of a country by 
influencing the control of corruption (cc) and political stability and absence of 
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violence/terrorism (pv) indicators. For example, ethnic conflicts are internal factors because 
they arise in a country or in a particular geographic boundary. This internal cocnflict may 
decrease the political stability of the country and its economic growth may decline. Countries 
such as Iraq and Libya provide examples for the importance of political stability to the 
economic growth of a country. If the new government of a country takes rigid action to control 
corruption, it may increase the country’s economic growth.  
In addition to the internal factors, many external factors may influence the economic growth of 
a country. Interstate wars can jeopardise the political stability of countries within a short period 
of time. The resultant political instability may reduce the economic growth of a country and of 
the whole region. As far as the control of corruption is concerned, if international organisations 
or the international community influences the countries that have highly corrupted 
governments, they may cause an increase in the economic growth of the country or the region.  
Therefore, it is necessary to keep both political stability and control of corruption indicators in 
a balance to achieve a sustainable and long-run economic growth. 
In our sample, 23 countries moved from the low-income category to the middle-income 
category between 2002 and 2014. During this period, economies of another 12 countries 
transited from middle-income group to the high-income group. The examples of the countries 
that transferred from the low income economies to the middle income economies include 
Indonesia, Mongolia, Vietnam and Georgia. All of these countries improved both real per capita 
GDP (PPP) and the governance qualities during the period.  As Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2010) point out, economic growth does not improve the governance qualities much, so we can 
assume these countries increased their real per capita GDP by improving their governance 
qualities. According to our data, when Georgia is considered, the country has improved the real 
per capita GDP in international dollars (constant 2011) from 3663 to 8749 between 2002 
and 2014. In this period, the corruption control index of the country improved from -1.139 to 
0.742. The political stability and absence of violence/terrorism indicator grew from -1.361 to -
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0.233. In Indonesia, the real per capita GDP increased by international dollars (constant 2011) 
by 3912 between 2002 and 2014. This shows a 64% growth in comparison with 2002. During 
the period, corruption control (cc) and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pv) 
indicators improved by 0.557 and 1.252. These figures highlight the importance of the control 
of corruption and political stability and the absence of violence in reaching higher economic 
growth. 
 
8. CONCLUSION  
This research uncovers some of the most critical areas relevant to the empirical relationship 
between the governance and economic growth. Most countries make policies to deal with 
foreign direct investments, gross capital formation, government expenditure and international 
trade with the objective of achieving a higher economic growth. However, this research 
suggests that the impact of governance on economic growth may be greater than the effects of 
the other determinants. That means the influence on critical governance factors increases the 
economic growth at a higher rate than its influence on other growth determinants, such as 
foreign direct investment, gross capital formation, government expenditure and 
international trade.   
Corruption control is the most important determinant of economic growth in the model. The 
control of corruption shows a significant positive relationship to economic growth at the 5% 
significance level, and it shows the highest contribution in the magnitude, among all other 
variables. By increasing one unit in the control of corruption indicator, the real per capita GDP 
(PPP) level increases on average by 6.9% at the 5% significance level, if all other variables are 
constant.  
Economic growth is affected by regional specific characteristics. All other regions except the 
Middle East and North Africa, show a significantly lower real per capita GDP growth (PPP) in 
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comparison with the reference group. Further, the Middle East and North Africa exhibit 
insignificance and lower economic growth in comparison with the reference group. When South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan-Africa are studied, the economic growth of these two areas is lower than 
all the other regions. The economic growth in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are 
respectively 80% and 84% lower in comparison to the reference group. While Latin America 
shows 55% lower growth in real per capita GDP than reference group, the growth reduction for 
both Central and East Asia and Pacific regions approximately 40%. Most importantly, the 
control of corruption indicator shows a close link with real per capita GDP growth in each 
region.  
The study found that, economic growth rate of high-income countries is significantly higher 
than the low-income countries. On average, high-income countries show 20% higher economic 
growth rates in comparison to the middle-income reference group. When the relationship 
between low-income and the middle-income countries is considered, the economic growth in 
low-income countries is 23.5% lower than in the middle-income reference group.   
As this research reveals, control of corruption increases economic growth. However, the 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism indicator becomes significant at the 10% 
significance level in the random effects model, and the sign of the coefficient is positive. In 
addition, when the geographical regions and the income level of the countries are studied, the 
growth patterns show a close relationship between political stability and absence of violence 
indicators. Therefore, there may be a practical positive relationship between political stability 
and absence of violence indicators and economic growth. In practical terms, political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism indicators need to be increased or managed effectively to get 
the benefits of the control of corruption. Therefore, both corruption control and political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism are also the most important pillars of economic 
growth. If, in a country or a particular geographical region, one of these indicators (control of 
corruption and absence of violence) deteriorates, it may cause a decrease in the economic 
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growth in the country or the region. Therefore, the right mix of political stability and control of 
corruption is necessary to maximise the economic growth. Further, this research finds that the 
voice and accountability indicator is not significant in either the fixed or random effects models.  
In conclusion, governance has a direct impact on economic growth. The control of corruption 
is a critical determinant of economic growth. It is important to manage both the control of 
corruption indicator, and the political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism indicator 
effectively to increase the economic growth. The regional specific characters and the income 
level of the country show a close relationship with the governance quality. Corruption control 
is the critical determinant of economic growth and a one unit increase in the corruption control 
causes on average a 6.9% increase in real per capita GDP at the 5 level of significance, if all 
other variables are constant. The proper mix of corruption control and political stability will 
have a positive effect on human and physical capital accumulation, improve the quality of 
institutions and other social infrastructure, and thereby increase economic growth. Therefore, 
countries need to improve both political stability and control of corruption to increase the 
economic growth.  
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 LIST OF COUNTRIES IN THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
Note: In addition to the United States and Canada from North America were included 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa The Middle East and North 
Africa 
South Asia 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Cote d’lvoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,  
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nambia, 
Niger, Nigeria,  Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, West Bank and 
Gaza, Zimbabwe 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt Arab 
Republic, Iran Islamic Republic, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates,  
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,  
Europe and Central Asia East Asia and the Pacific Latin America 
Albania, Armenia, , Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Georgia, Iceland, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic,  Lao PDR, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Suriname, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine,   United Kingdom, 
Uzbekistan,  
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, China, , Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea Republic, 
Macao,  Malaysia, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vanuatu, Vietnam,  
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, 
Costa  Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Honduras, Jameica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, St Lucia, St 
Vincent, Uruguay 
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